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Abstract
In this work we describe, design and analyze the se-
curity of a tamper-evident, append-only data struc-
ture for maintaining secure data sequences in a
loosely coupled distributed system where individ-
ual system components may be mutually distrust-
ful. The resulting data structure, called an Authen-
ticated Append-Only Skip List (AASL), allows its
maintainers to produce one-way digests of the entire
data sequence, which they can publish to others as
a commitment on the contents and order of the se-
quence. The maintainer can produce efficiently suc-
cinct proofs that authenticate a particular datum
in a particular position of the data sequence against
a published digest. AASLs are secure against tam-
pering even by malicious data structure maintain-
ers. First, we show that a maintainer cannot “in-
vent” and authenticate data elements for the AASL
after he has committed to the structure. Second,
he cannot equivocate by being able to prove con-
flicting facts about a particular position of the data
sequence. This is the case even when the data se-
quence grows with time and its maintainer publishes
successive commitments at times of his own choos-
ing.
AASLs can be invaluable in reasoning about the
integrity of system logs maintained by untrusted
components of a loosely-coupled distributed sys-
tem.
1 Introduction
Dependable systems rely heavily on logs of
data, system events, transactions, and security
decisions. Inspecting such logs while the sys-
tem is running (on-line) or after an exceptional
event has caused the system to cease opera-
tions (off-line) can help maintain accountabil-
ity through audit trails, repair failures through
undo/redo logs, and improve performance via
profiling.
In distributed systems, especially those in-
tended for loosely-coupled communities of in-
dependent components (generally called peer-
to-peer systems), it is frequently infeasible to
maintain a central system log; in fact, often
there is no central authority that can be trusted
by all participating components to maintain a
log faithfully. Instead, each component stores
its own log of events observed locally, or of in-
teractions with other components. The log for
the entire system does not exist physically; it
is made up of log fragments scattered around
different system components.
These distributed log fragments must be pe-
rused for answers when a failure occurs or a
component is reported as misbehaving. For ex-
ample, consider a distributed file system, where
component A requests that component B store
datum d and B accepts. Later A attempts to
retrieve datum d from B and B denies having
this datum. A can convincingly accuse B of
misbehavior only if it can show that, at first,
B agreed to hold d and, later, B denied having
done so.
In such a setting, logs can be a very sensi-
tive and vulnerable system resource. A com-
ponent, along with the entity that operates it,
cannot trust another component to retain the
order of its locally logged events or to refrain
from changing events after it has logged them.
This prevents A, in the example above, from us-
ing B’s log to justify its accusation. Similarly,
2an arbiter must be skeptical of an accusation
made by A that relies on the integrity of A’s
log.
The problem has been addressed in the lit-
erature via the use of collision-resistant hash
functions to link the contents of earlier log en-
tries to later ones [4, 5, 8, 9]. The collision-
resistance property of the hash functions used
makes it very difficult to “rewrite history” in a
sensitive log, without causing dramatic changes
in the entire log. However, with very few ex-
ceptions (notably, work by Buldas et al. [2]),
no attention has been paid to the scalability
of such hash-based techniques when logs grow
very long and interesting sensitive log entries
may have been created years—and billions of
log entries—ago.
In this paper, we analyze the security of the
Authenticated Append-only Skip List (AASL).
The AASL is a novel data structure that is de-
signed for the efficient maintenance of and ac-
cess to very large, tamper-evident sequences of
data. AASLs provide a mechanism for detect-
ing structural corruption, such as modification,
removal or reordering of data, whenever those
data are accessed. We have used AASLs in
Timeweave [5], a mechanism that allows com-
ponents of a distributed system to maintain a
local trustworthy view of a global system log.
A distributed system component that main-
tains an AASL can compute succinct one-way
digests of the entire structure; these digests
can serve as a commitment on the data struc-
ture contents and order, and can be conveyed
to other system components as such. A re-
mote component wishing to establish whether
a particular datum appears in such a data se-
quence (membership) can request a proof from
the maintainer of the AASL. This proof can be
verified against the digest to which the main-
tainer has committed.
AASLs are guaranteed to prevent maintain-
ers from proving conflicting facts about a data
sequence, even at different points in the evolu-
tion of the sequence over time. In this paper, we
describe the construction of AASLs and prove
the security guarantees they offer.
2 Background
In this section, we describe related work that
protects sensitive logs from tampering, and re-
lated work on securing the contents of skip lists.
The integrity of public logs or commit-
ment sequences has traditionally been pro-
tected through the use of one-way hash func-
tions. Spreitzer et al. [9] describe how to pro-
tect the modification order of a weakly consis-
tent, replicated data system, by placing succes-
sive write and read operations in a hash chain;
this is a linked list, where every element is an-
notated with a label computed by hashing to-
gether the value of the element and the label of
the preceding element. Schneier and Kelsey [8]
propose a historic integrity scheme for logs of
untrusted or vulnerable machines. Their work
protects access-controlled log entries against
tampering or unauthorized retroactive disclo-
sure through hash chaining. In secure digital
time stamping [4], a digital notary places docu-
ments in a hash chain, so as to be able to derive
temporal precedences between document com-
mitments.
Unfortunately, reasoning about simple hash
chains can be very expensive when they grow
long. To check that a particular element occu-
pies the beginning of the chain, all the hashes
between that element and the end of the chain
must be performed. Buldas et al. [2] improve
greatly on this linear cost; they describe opti-
mally efficient hash graphs that permit the ex-
traction of such temporal precedences with op-
timal proof sizes, on the order of the logarithm
of the size of the graph.
Goodrich et al. [3] retrofit skip lists for
tamper-evidence. In that work, the authors
propose an authenticated skip list that relies
on commutative hashing. Anagnostopoulos et
al. [1] extend this construct to deal with per-
sistent data collections, where older versions of
the skip list are available, and they are each, by
themselves, an authenticated skip list. How-
ever, these structures are not designed to be
append-only. As a result, they are not well-
suited for tamper-evident logs: a malicious
maintainer can remove and then reinsert ele-
3ments from the “middle” of the structure across
version changes. A verifier must check vigi-
lantly that a log entry that interests him re-
mains consistently in every new version of the
structure produced by the maintainer, which
can be very expensive when versions are pro-
duced frequently.
We have used the structure described in this
paper in previous work [5] to preserve the his-
toric integrity of a loosely coupled distributed
system. Here we focus on a detailed design
and analysis of the security guarantees that the
structure offers.
3 Design
An Authenticated Append-only Skip List
(AASL) is a data structure conceptually based
on skip lists [7]. Skip lists are sorted linked
lists with extra links, designed to allow fast
lookup of the stored data elements by taking
“shortcuts.” The basic idea is to enhance linked
lists, which connect each element in the data se-
quence to its successor, by also linking some ele-
ments to successors further down the sequence.
Roughly half of the elements have links to their
two-hop successor, roughly a quarter of the el-
ements have links to their four-hop successor,
and so on. As a result, during traversal from
element a to element b, the traversal path fol-
lows repeatedly the longest available link from
the current element that does not overshoot the
destination b, and thereby reaches b in fewer
steps than would be possible by just travers-
ing every intervening element between a and b.
Skip list traversals achieve logarithmic traver-
sal path lengths in the number of data elements
in the structure, as opposed to the linear paths
offered by regular linked lists.
3.1 AASL construction
AASLs take advantage of the shortcut idea, de-
scribed above, albeit in a deterministic fash-
ion as opposed to the randomized nature of the
original skip lists. AASLs of n elements consist
of log2 n coexisting linked lists, each designated
by a different level number. The linked list at
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Figure 1: An example of a deterministic skip
list, containing 10 data elements. Boxes denote
element positions (indices), and circles denote
the actual element data. We represent the skip
list as an overlapping set of linked lists, each
at a different level. Pointers are marked with
the level of the linked list to which they belong.
The thick gray line outlines a traversal of the
skip list, from the 3rd to the 7th element.
level 0 is a regular linked list connecting all el-
ements in the data sequence. The linked list at
level 1 is a linked list that only contains every
other element from the original data sequence.
The linked list at level l contains every 2l-th el-
ement of the original data sequence. Element i
belongs to the l-level linked list if and only if i
is divisible by 2l. Figure 1 illustrates this basic
structure.
AASL elements, in addition to their datum
and their index number, carry an authenticator.
The authenticator T i for the i-th element is a
value derived via a few applications of a one-
way hash function h, such as SHA-1 [6], to the
datum di of the i-th element and the authen-
ticators of the immediate predecessors of that
element on each of the linked lists in which it
appears.
More specifically, an authenticator is com-
puted in two steps (see Figure 2). First, the
partial authenticators for an element are com-
puted, one for each list in which that element
participates. A partial authenticator is a value
computed by hashing together the current in-
dex number, the current datum, the current list
level, and the authenticator of the preceding el-
ement on that list. The partial authenticator
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Figure 2: An illustration of the construction of
the skip list authenticators for elements 9 and
10. The construction of the 8-th authenticator
is not shown.
Lli for the element in position i on the list at
level l is computed by
Lli = h(i‖l‖di‖T
i−2l) (1)
where ‖ denotes bit-string concatenation. Sec-
ond, the partial authenticators are combined,
again using the hash function, to produce the
element authenticator. The authenticator T i of
the i-th element is computed by
T i = h(L0i ‖L
1
i ‖ . . . ‖L
fi
i ) (2)
where fi is the highest level of linked list in
which the i-th element appears. fi is defined
by the relation
fi = {n : i = 2
nr ∧ gcd(2, r) = 1} (3)
A very useful property of skip lists is that
they can be traversed from a source element i
to a destination element n (i ≥ n) in a num-
ber of steps that is logarithmic in the elements
of the structure. At every step, a linked list
at the highest level is picked, among those in
which the current element participates, so as
to travel the farthest distance towards the des-
tination, without overtaking it. Algorithm 1
specifies how a single hop is chosen for such a
traversal. The thick gray line in Figure 1 illus-
trates a traversal of the structure.
3.2 AASL Membership Proofs
The primary use of AASLs is to support au-
thenticated answers to membership questions,
Algorithm 1 SingleHopTraversalLevel
(i, n) ⇒ l. Return the highest linked list level l
that must be followed in the AASL from element i
to element n, where i ≥ n.
1: l ← 0
2: while 2l divides i do
3: if i+ 2l ≤ n then
4: L← l {L-hop does not overtake n.}
5: else
6: Return L {Last safe hop level.}
7: end if
8: l ← l + 1
9: end while
10: Return L {The highest level possible for i.}
such as “what is the 7-th element in the
AASL?”, while maintaining the append-only
property of the AASL. To accomplish this func-
tionality, it is important, first, that the party
asking the question (the verifier) know in which
AASL she is asking that question; and, sec-
ond, that once the verifier receives a response,
she holds that response as unequivocal for the
AASL in question.
An AASL is uniquely determined by a digest.
This is the authenticator of the last appended
element into the structure. The maintainer of
an AASL conveys this short value to potential
verifiers as commitment to the exact contents
of the AASL. A verifier who receives such a di-
gest verifies all subsequent exchanges with the
maintainer against this digest.
A response to a membership question on the
contents of an AASL consists of a membership
claim and a membership proof. A membership
claim has the form “Data element d occupies
the i-th position of the AASL whose n-th au-
thenticator is known to the verifier,” and is
denoted by 〈i, n, d〉. The corresponding mem-
bership proof is denoted by Ei,n,d. This proof
convinces the verifier that, first, the maintainer
had decided what the i-th value d would be be-
fore issuing the n-th authenticator; second, the
maintainer cannot authenticate any other value
d′ 6= d as the value of the i-th element of the
AASL with the known n-th authenticator T .
The AASL maintainer constructs the mem-
bership proof Ei,n,d by traversing the AASL
5from the i-th to the n-th element, hop by
hop, as described by SingleHopTraversal-
Level. For every encountered skip list ele-
ment j, the maintainer constructs a proof com-
ponent Cj that consists of the j-th data el-
ement and the authenticators of its predeces-
sors on all the linked lists in which it appears:
Cj = 〈dj ; 〈T
j−2l : 0 ≤ l ≤ fj〉〉. The sequence
of all proof components makes up the member-
ship proof Ei,n,d = 〈Cj : j ∈ Si,n〉, where Si,n
is the sequence of elements traversed from i to
n. The appendix contains Algorithm 6, which
describes the construction process for a single
proof component, and Algorithm 7, which out-
lines the overall proof construction process.
The verifier processes a membership proof
against the AASL authenticator that it holds
to verify the validity of a membership claim.
The verification process mimics the proof con-
struction process. The verifier’s job, however,
is to make sure that the purported proof is
well-formed and yields the known authentica-
tor starting with the element datum and posi-
tion in the maintainer’s membership claim. The
verification may succeed with a positive result,
which means that the claim is true; it may suc-
ceed with a negative result, which means that
the claim is false, i.e., it cannot be true; and it
may fail, in which case nothing is known about
the claim, except that the supplied proof is in-
appropriate for the given claim.
For every element j in the traversal from the
i-th to the n-th element, the verifier checks that
the corresponding component C in the proof
is formed as component Cj should be formed;
he then uses that component to compute what
the j-th authenticator should be based on that
component. Furthermore, since, during traver-
sal, the authenticator of a traversed element is
always used in the computation of the authenti-
cator of the next traversed element, the verifier
must check that the authenticators it computes
in earlier steps of the verification process are
consistent with those used in later verification
steps. Finally, the proof must be checked for
applicability, that is, it should match the claim
it purportedly proves: if a membership proof
claims to prove the membership claim 〈i, n, d〉,
then the datum in the first proof component
should be d.
Algorithm 2 details how a single proof com-
ponent is handled by the verification pro-
cess. Algorithm 3 details the overall proof
verification process, making use of the single-
component proof verification from Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 ProcessProofComponent
(j, C) ⇒ T . Process the proof component C that
corresponds to the j-th element in an AASL, and
return the resulting j-th AASL authenticator.
1: 〈d; 〈T0, T1, . . . , TF 〉〉 ← C {Parse C.}
2: if F 6= fj then
3: Proof component is invalid
4: end if
5: P ← ∅
6: for l = 0 to F do
7: L← h(j‖l‖d‖Tl) {Calculates L
l
j . If the proof
is correct, then Tl must be T
j−2l in the orig-
inal AASL.}
8: P ← P‖L
9: end for
10: T ← h(P ) {Should calculate T j.}
11: Return T
Section 4 proves the security properties of
AASLs, as described informally above. Namely,
given an AASL digest known to verifiers who
follow ProcessMembershipProof, the main-
tainer can only authenticate a single, unique
membership claim per element to any of those
verifiers, and he can determine that digest only
after he has decided which claims he wishes to
authenticate.
3.3 AASL Evolution
AASLs are useful in distributing the contents
of fixed-forever data sequences, but can be in-
valuable in distributing the contents of data se-
quences that grow over time. In this section
we address how AASLs can be used when the
data sequences on which they are based evolve
over time, especially when the verifier needs to
access the sequence as it changes.
As new elements are appended to a data se-
quence that a maintainer keeps in an AASL, the
AASL grows with new authenticators for the
new elements. Whenever it is necessary to com-
6Algorithm 3 ProcessMembershipProof
(i, n, d, T, E) ⇒ TRUE/FALSE . Process the
membership proof E of the membership claim
〈i, n, d〉 against authenticator T .
1: 〈C1, C2, . . . , CS〉 ← E {Parse E.}
2: Tcur ← ProcessProofComponent (i, C1)
{Should calculate T i.}
3: Tprev ← Tcur
4: l ← SingleHopTraversalLevel (i, n)
5: j ← i+ 2l
6: c← 2 {Component counter.}
7: while j ≤ n do
8: Tcur ← ProcessProofComponent (j, Cc)
{Should return T j.}
9: 〈d′; 〈T0, T1, . . . , TF 〉〉 ← Cc
10: if Tl 6= Tprev then
11: Proof is invalid {The values for the same
authenticator computed in the previous
step and included in the current compo-
nent differ.}
12: end if
13: Tprev ← Tcur
14: l ← SingleHopTraversalLevel (j, n)
15: j ← j + 2l
16: c← c+ 1
17: end while
18: if S 6= c then
19: Proof is invalid {Wrong number of proof com-
ponents.}
20: end if
21: if Tcur 6= T then
22: Proof is invalid {The T n just computed from
the proof is different from the T n known.}
23: end if
24: 〈d′; 〈. . .〉〉 ← C1 {Parse the datum in the first
component.}
25: if d = d′ then
26: Return TRUE
27: else
28: Return FALSE
29: end if
mit to newer versions of the AASL, the main-
tainer updates verifiers with the new AASL di-
gest, i.e., the currently last AASL authentica-
tor. In addition to the security guarantees de-
scribed in the previous section, verifiers of a dy-
namic AASL must also be convinced that mem-
bership claims they verified in previous versions
of the AASL remain true in the new version.
Simply, the AASL maintainer must be unable
to “rewrite history” to which he has committed
in the past when he advances to a new version
of the structure.
The preservation of AASL history is sup-
ported by an advancement proof, which accom-
panies the new digest in an AASL version up-
date. An advancement proof is very similar to a
membership proof. Intuitively, an advancement
proof authenticates a membership claim about
an authenticator, instead of a data value. We
call this an advancement claim; it has the form
“Tprev is the i-th authenticator of the AASL
whose n-th authenticator is Tnew .”
Because advancement proofs are basically
membership proofs, their construction is al-
most identical to membership proof construc-
tion, and their components have the same form.
Advancement proof Ai,n from the i-th to the n-
th AASL authenticator is the same as member-
ship proof Ei,n,d without the first proof compo-
nent. The first proof component of a member-
ship proof computes the authenticator of the
source element from the element datum and
earlier AASL authenticators; this step is un-
necessary when the source element authentica-
tor is already known, as is the case with ad-
vancement. In the appendix, we outline the
advancement proof construction algorithm (Al-
gorithm 8). Figure 3 illustrates an example of
advancement.
A verifier need remember three pieces of in-
formation for a given remote dynamic AASL:
the latest AASL size n, the latest digest T , and
a vector of earlier authenticators called a basis.
The basis vector is used to check consistency
among the values of “reusable” authenticators
included in different advancement proofs for the
same AASL. Reusable authenticators are those
AASL authenticators that may appear again in
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Figure 3: An example of advancement in a dy-
namic AASL. In version 1, the AASL has ele-
ments 1 through 9. The corresponding advance-
ment proof from the empty AASL to version 1 is
A0,9 = 〈〈d8; 〈T
7, T 6, T 4, T 0〉〉, 〈d9; 〈T
8〉〉〉. Then
the maintainer adds element 10 and publishes
version 2, with advancement proof A9,10 =
〈〈d10; 〈T
9, T 8〉〉〉. The gray links delineate the
traversal paths that the two advancements take.
subsequent advancement proofs for the AASL.
In the appendix, we illustrate an example of
cheating that a malicious AASL maintainer can
perpetrate when he is free to use inconsistent
values for such reusable authenticators across
advancements.
The structure of a basis vector resembles the
binary representation of the AASL element in-
dex to which it corresponds. Specifically, basis
Bi for element i is a vector of l authenticators,
where l = ⌊log2 i⌋ is the number of significant
bits in the binary representation of i. The vec-
tor contains a special “empty” value in those
positions in which the binary representation of
i contains a 0; the rest of the basis vector’s
positions are occupied by authenticator values.
These authenticator values correspond to the
authenticators of the elements encountered in
the traversal of the AASL from element 0 to ele-
ment i. A traversal from 0 to i proceeds in hops
of decreasing length, starting with the largest
power of 2 that is less than or equal to the des-
tination. For example, for destination 9 (binary
1001), the traversal from 0 first hops over 8 = 23
elements to element 8, and then over one last
element (20) to element 9 (see Figure 3). In the
associated basis B9, each non-zero “bit” posi-
tion is annotated with the authenticator of the
element from which the corresponding traver-
sal hop launches, that is B9 = 〈T 0,∅,∅, T 8〉.
The basis B0 for the 0-th element (the initial
value of the AASL) contains no values. Note
that verifiers need not remember bases for a
static AASLs, since the concept of advancement
is meaningless in those.
Advancement proof verification occurs in two
phases. First, the verifier checks whether the
last digest he holds can appear in the AASL
of the new digest. This check is almost iden-
tical to the verification of membership proofs,
as described in Section 3.2, with the exception
that what is verified is the membership of an
authenticator, not a datum, in the AASL.
The second phase of checking an advance-
ment proof deals with the basis. For every
component in the proof, the authenticators in-
cluded therein are checked against the values
of any corresponding authenticators in the ba-
sis. If the component is consistent with remem-
bered authenticator values, the basis is updated
with any reusable authenticators seen first in
the component. In the end, the basis is up-
dated to reflect the newly acquired digest and
advancement proof. Algorithm 4 provides the
details, and is reminiscent of binary addition of
positive integers.
ProcessAdvancementProofComponent is
invoked once for every component in the ad-
vancement proof, after that component has
been processed as a membership proof compo-
nent. Algorithm 5 describes how the whole ad-
vancement proof verification proceeds.
A powerful use of AASLs is to determine the
possible relative orders of insertion of different
data in the maintainer’s tamper-evident data
sequence. For example, let Molly by an AASL
maintainer who claims that she did not learn
value a until after she had committed to value
b. If verifier Van holds valid proofs of the mem-
bership claims 〈i, j, a〉 and 〈k, n, b〉 in Molly’s
AASL, where i < j < k < n, then he can con-
vince anyone who agrees on Molly’s j-th and n-
th AASL authenticators that she is lying; Molly
must have known value a before her commit-
ment to the j-th authenticator, and therefore
8Algorithm 4 ProcessAdvancementProof-
Component (j, T,B,C, l) ⇒ B′. Process an ad-
vancement component C that takes a hop of level
l from the j-th digest T with basis B. Return the
new basis.
1: 〈d; 〈T0, T1, . . . , TF 〉〉 ← C {Parse C.}
2: if F 6= fj then
3: Proof component is invalid {The component
contains the wrong number of authentica-
tors.}
4: end if
5: 〈B0, . . . , Bb〉 ← B {The values in the basis vec-
tor.}
6: if Bl = ∅ then
7: Bl ← T
8: Return 〈B0, . . . , Bb〉
9: else
10: c← l {Current basis element.}
11: while Bc 6= ∅ do
12: if Bc 6= Tc+1 then
13: Advancement is invalid. {The main-
tainer is now sending a different value
(Tc+1) for an authenticator whose value
he reported as Bc before.}
14: end if
15: carry ← Bc
16: Bc ← ∅
17: c← c+ 1
18: end while
19: Bc ← carry
20: Return 〈B0, . . . , Bmax{b,c}〉 {The vector may
have grown by one non-empty element.}
21: end if
Algorithm 5 ProcessAdvancementProof
(i, n, Tprev , Bprev , Tnew , A)⇒ Bnew . Process the ad-
vancement proof A that establishes Tnew as the n-th
authenticator, starting with the i-th authenticator
Tprev and basis Bprev . The process returns the new
basis Bnew , if successful.
1: 〈C2, . . . , CS〉 ← A {Parse A. The numbering
starts with 2, to be consistent with the num-
bering in ProcessMembershipProof.}
2: c← 2 {Component counter.}
3: j ← i
4: while j < n do
5: l ← SingleHopTraversalLevel (j, n)
6: Bnew ← ProcessAdvancementProof-
Component (j, Tprev , Bprev , Cc, l) {This re-
turns Bj+2
l
.}
7: j ← j + 2l {Next element in traversal.}
8: Tcur ← ProcessProofComponent (j, Cc)
{Should be T j.}
9: 〈d; 〈T0, T1, . . . , TF 〉〉 ← Cc {Parse Cc.}
10: if Tl 6= Tprev then {Tprev should be T
j−2l .}
11: Proof is invalid {The value of T j−2
l
com-
puted in the previous step is not the same
as the value for T j−2
l
in the current proof
component.}
12: end if
13: Tprev ← Tcur
14: Bprev ← Bnew
15: c← c+ 1
16: end while
17: if S 6= c then
18: Proof is invalid {Wrong number of proof com-
ponents.}
19: end if
20: if Tcur 6= Tnew then
21: Proof is invalid {The T n claimed by the ad-
vancement is different from the one computed
by processing the advancement proof.}
22: end if
23: Return Bnew
9before her commitment to b. Such temporal or-
derings can apply also to the data themselves,
when those data contain a “freshness marker”,
as is the case, for example, with signed state-
ments containing a nonce. We detail how tem-
poral ordering in a distributed log can be pre-
served in the Timeweave project [5].
In the next section, we prove the security
properties of static AASLs, described in Sec-
tion 3.2, and of dynamic AASLs, described in
this section.
4 Security Analysis
In this section, we substantiate the security
guarantees that AASLs offer to their users. Our
goal is to secure the “commitment metaphor” of
AASLs for verifiers who follow the membership
and advancement proof verification procedures
described in the previous section. Informally,
this means that, first, diligent verifiers accept
only a single, unique membership claim for ev-
ery position in the data sequence on which an
AASL is built; second, the data structure main-
tainer must decide which membership claims he
can prove before he commits to the AASL by
giving a digest to potential verifiers.
There are two distinct “roles” that a mali-
cious adversary can take, with regards to an
AASL. On one hand, the adversary may be an
eavesdropper, who wishes to prove to a verifier
a false membership claim of his choosing, for
an AASL that he does not maintain. On the
other hand, the adversary may be the AASL
maintainer, who wishes either to defer choosing
to which membership claim to commit until af-
ter he has apparently committed; or to prove
conflicting membership claims to different veri-
fiers (a membership claim 〈i, n, d〉 conflicts with
membership claim 〈i, n′, d′〉 if d 6= d′). A mali-
cious AASL maintainer is a more powerful ad-
versary, because he can use arbitrary means to
produce a digest before he has to relay it to po-
tential verifiers. In what follows, we prove that
AASLs are resistant to such attacks.
First, we show that an adversary is unable to
construct convincing membership proofs (that
he has not already seen) from a random AASL
digest. This prevents a malicious eavesdropper
from proving false membership claims. This
also prevents a malicious AASL maintainer
from committing to bogus digests and only de-
ciding later what to prove to its unsuspecting
verifiers. This property is similar to the pre-
image resistance property of one-way functions.
Theorem 1 (AASL Membership Proof
Pre-image Resistance). Consider randomly
chosen T from the set of values of the hash
function h. A computationally bound adversary
cannot construct efficiently an AASL member-
ship proof Ei,n,d of any datum d in position i of
an n-element AASL, for any i and n (0 < i ≤
n).
This result follows directly from the pre-
image resistance of the hash function h.
Suppose the adversary can pick d, i and n
and construct a membership proof Ei,n,d of d
in position i, where T is the given n-th authen-
ticator, so that a verifier in possession of T and
following Algorithms 2 and 3 accepts the proof.
Given Ei,n,d, i, d, n and T , Algorithm 3 exe-
cuted by the verifier must fail to match the con-
dition of Line 21. This means that in the last
iteration of Line 8, Tcur returned from Algo-
rithm 2 must be the random T given to the ad-
versary in the challenge. However, this means
that, in Line 10 of Algorithm 2, the adver-
sary must be able to find a pre-image of the
pre-image resistant hash function h for random
image T . As a result, the hypothesis is false,
and the adversary cannot produce a pre-image
proof.
Theorem 1 only deals with cheap, unsophis-
ticated malice. We proceed by addressing more
sophisticated attacks that rely on the manipu-
lation of corrupt AASLs by their maintainer or
on the manipulation of observed proofs by an
eavesdropper. There are three types of such at-
tacks. First, the adversary can modify correct
proofs to make them prove a false membership
claim. Second, the maintainer can produce an
AASL digest against which he can prove con-
flicting membership claims. Third, the main-
tainer can produce AASL digests and advance-
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ment proofs so as to prove conflicting mem-
bership claims against different versions of the
AASL. We call the first two attacks second pre-
image and collision, respectively. We call the
third attack evolutionary collision, because it
relies on subverting AASL evolution across ver-
sions.
In the next theorem, we prove that AASLs
are resistant to the second type of attack, col-
lision attacks (Theorem 2). AASLs are also re-
sistant to the first type of attack, second pre-
image, but the proof is a direct corollary of col-
lision resistance, so we defer to the Appendix
for it (Theorem 4).
Theorem 2 (AASL Membership Proof
Collision Resistance). A computationally
bound adversary cannot construct two member-
ship proofs E and E′ verifiable against the same
authenticator T that authenticate different data
values in the same sequence position.
Suppose that an adversary can, in fact, con-
struct an efficient proof collision with proofs E
and E′ against common authenticator T . Let
the two membership claims be t = 〈i, n, d〉 and
t′ = 〈i, n′, d′〉, respectively (t 6= t′). We trace
ProcessMembershipProof backwards for both
proofs E and E′ in parallel, and reach a viola-
tion of the one-way properties of the hash func-
tion h.
Since both membership proofs can be verified
against the same authenticator T (which corre-
sponds to a purported AASL’s n-th element in
the case of E and a different purported AASL’s
n′-th element in the case of E′), in the last it-
eration of Line 8 of Algorithm 3, the invocation
of Algorithm 2 must yield the same result T . In
this last iteration, local variable j, the current
element of the purported AASL, is equal to n
and n′, respectively.
However, this means that the adversary must
be able to cause the verifier to invoke Pro-
cessProofComponent with input (n,C) and
(n′, C ′) but receive the same result T for both
invocations. This is equivalent to passing to
Equations 1 and 2 different i’s and T ’s but cal-
culating the same T i. Intuitively, since the
two equations use a one-way hash function,
this should be impossible, i.e., ProcessProof-
Component should only return the same result
when invoked with identical inputs (we prove
this rigorously in the Appendix, in Lemma 1).
Therefore, in the last iteration ProcessProof-
Component can only be invoked with (n,C)
and (n′, C ′) if n = n′. This restricts our as-
sumed proof collision to support membership
claims that only differ in the data values d and
d′.
Since both proofs authenticate position i in
an n-length AASL, Line 18 of ProcessMem-
bershipProof imposes that the proof lengths
must be equal to the same S. We prove induc-
tively on the number of components in the two
proofs that the two proofs must be identical.
Induction follows the iterations of the loop in
ProcessMembershipProof, Lines 7 – 17, from
last iteration to first.
The base case for the last components CS and
C ′S , respectively, follows directly from the col-
lision resistance claim of ProcessProofCom-
ponent (Lemma 1 in the appendix) and from
the supposition that both proofs are verifiable
against the same authenticator T .
To establish the inductive step, consider the
c-th proof components Cc and C
′
c of the two
membership proofs and assume they are equal.
In the associated loop iteration in Process-
MembershipProof, Line 9 extracts the individ-
ual F hash values of the c-th proof component;
these are pairwise equal across the two respec-
tive proof components, since the components
themselves are equal. The l-th of these hash
values must be equal to the value of the respec-
tive Tprev , in Line 10. Since the l-th hash values
are equal across proofs, the values of Tprev are
the same in the invocations of ProcessMem-
bershipProof for the two membership proofs.
But, in the previous loop iteration, in Line 13,
Tprev had been assigned the value of the re-
spective Tcur , computed using ProcessProof-
Component in Line 8. Because of the colli-
sion resistance of ProcessProofComponent,
this means that the inputs to the two respec-
tive invocations of ProcessProofComponent
must also be identical in that loop iteration,
which means that the (c − 1)-st element com-
11
ponents Cc−1 and C
′
c−1, respectively, are also
identical. This proves the inductive step.
The induction applies to all but the first
proof components in the two proofs, which are
processed outside the loop of ProcessMember-
shipProof, in Lines 2 – 5. The same argu-
ment as the inductive step above can also be
applied here: the Tcur returned by the respec-
tive invocations of ProcessProofComponent
on the respective first proof components is the
same Tprev that ends up matching the identical
l-th hash values of the respective, equal second
proof components in Line 10 of the first loop it-
eration. Consequently, the respective first proof
components must also be equal.
We have shown that two proofs E and E′ au-
thenticating the same element position i against
the same authenticator T must be identical.
But in ProcessMembershipProof, Line 25,
the datum in the first component of a proof
must match the one whose membership is ver-
ified. This contradicts the collision hypothesis,
because the condition in Line 25 only succeeds
if the algorithm is invoked with the data value
that occupies the first proof component of the
two proofs. d and d′ cannot be different.
Finally, we prove that AASLs are resistant to
the third type of malicious manipulation attack,
evolutionary collision, in Theorem 3. AASLs
have the property of evolutionary collision-
resistance if it is impossible for a computation-
ally constrained adversary to produce advance-
ments and membership proofs that authenti-
cate two different data elements d and d′ 6= d
for the same position i, in any version of the
same AASL.
The definition is fairly broad in scope: it
covers unrelated, mutually unknown verifiers A
and B, who, through different sequences of ad-
vancements, arrive at the same digest T for po-
sition n of an AASL at different times; a mali-
cious prover must be unable to convince A that
d is at position i and convince B that d′ 6= d
is at position i, even in different versions of the
AASL in its separate evolution paths towards
length n and digest T .
Two advancements Ai,j and Ak,l are con-
nected if the source element of the latter ad-
vancement is the destination element of the for-
mer, that is j = k. In what follows, we refer
to a sequence of connected advancements as an
advancement sequence, and the sequence of ele-
ment positions traversed by that advancement
sequence as an advancement path. In a simi-
lar manner, we define the sequence of element
positions traversed by a membership proof as a
membership proof path.
Our proof strategy for evolutionary collision
resistance is to show that if two diligent veri-
fiers have both accepted the same authentica-
tor for the same AASL element, they must ar-
rive at the same value for the authenticators of
some other strategic AASL elements. Namely,
we show that the two verifiers must “agree”
on the authenticators they compute during the
processing of the membership proofs with which
the adversary seeks to fool them. From Theo-
rem 2, if two verifiers agree on the authentica-
tors computed during membership proof veri-
fication, they cannot be verifying the truth of
conflicting membership claims.
To reduce authenticator agreement during
the verification of independent advancement
paths to authenticator agreement during the
verification of independent membership proofs,
we use two “authenticator agreement claims,”
which we describe here informally, but prove
rigorously in the Appendix.
First, if a membership proof verification and
an advancement proof verification agree on the
value of a particular AASL authenticator, then
they must also agree on the authenticator val-
ues of all earlier AASL elements that the two
paths—the advancement and the membership
proof paths—have in common (see Lemma 7 in
the appendix).
Second, if two runs of the advancement veri-
fication algorithm, applied to two different ad-
vancement sequences, agree on the value of a
particular AASL authenticator, then they must
also agree on the authenticator values of all ear-
lier AASL elements that the two advancement
paths have in common (see Lemma 8 in the ap-
pendix).
Equipped with these two claims, we now
tackle evolutionary collision resistance.
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Theorem 3 (Evolutionary collision re-
sistance of AASL membership proofs.).
Consider two independent verifiers, A and B
and a computationally constrained adversary
who conveys to them independently two ad-
vancement sequences. It is impossible for the
adversary to produce advancement sequences
and membership proofs in such a way that, first,
the two verifiers, processing their respective ad-
vancement sequences, advance to element po-
sition n with the same digest T ; and, second,
the two verifiers, processing separate member-
ship proofs, authenticate, at any time, two con-
flicting membership claims.
It is already known, from Theorem 2, that
conflicting membership claims cannot be au-
thenticated against the same authenticator.
Here we address the case where the two aspir-
ing proofs authenticate different data values for
the same AASL position against the authenti-
cators of different versions of that AASL held
by the two verifiers.
Let i be the element position for whose data
element the adversary wishes to fool two ver-
ifiers, A and B, and let j and k be the ele-
ment positions against whose authenticators he
wishes to produce the offending proofs for the
verifiers; specifically, the adversary wishes to
authenticate the membership claims 〈i, j, d〉 to
A and 〈i, k, d′〉 to B. Without loss of generality,
we assume j < k, so 0 < i ≤ j < k ≤ n.
Consider the abstract illustration of this
setup in Figure 4. A’s advancement path,
the dark dashed line, does not necessarily go
through element i, but it certainly touches ele-
ment j (since the adversary’s membership proof
is authenticated to A against the j-th authen-
ticator) and element n (since the two verifiers
agree on the value of the n-th authenticator).
Similarly, B’s advancement path, the lighter
dashed line, does not necessarily go through el-
ement i, but certainly touches elements k and
n. A’s membership proof path (the thick dark
line) starts from i and ends at j, and B’s mem-
bership proof path (the lighter dark line) starts
from i and ends at k.
There is an element in [j, k], element m,
B’s membership
B’s advancement
A’s membership
A’s advancement
ji nkmr
Figure 4: Illustration of the proof of Theorem 3.
Verifier A advances to the n-th digest of the
AASL via element j. When A held the j-th di-
gest for the AASL, he had successfully authen-
ticated a datum for the i-th position. Verifier
B advances to the n-th digest of the AASL via
element k. When B held the k-th digest for
the AASL, he had successfully authenticated a
datum for the same i-th position as A did.
that is common among A’s advancement path,
B’s advancement path, and B’s membership
proof path. This results from the fact that
B’s membership proof and advancement paths
both start before element j and touch element
k, and A’s advancement path touches element
j and continues past element k. An intuitive
reason for this is that A’s advancement path
can skip element k only by “jumping” over it
on a high-level linked list. Then, B’s member-
ship proof and advancement paths must touch
the jumping-off point of A’s path, on their way
to “lower” k. We prove this claim rigorously in
Lemma 5, in the Appendix.
The two advancements agree on the value of
T n after processing the respective advancement
sequences in ProcessAdvancementProof, as
per the theorem assumption. Because of
the second authenticator agreement claim de-
scribed above, this means that the two advance-
ment algorithms also agree with each other on
the value of Tm after processing the correspond-
ing part of their respective advancement se-
quences that brings them both to element m.
Because B’s membership proof verification,
to succeed, must agree on the value of T k
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with the advancement verification algorithm,
and because of the first authenticator agree-
ment claim above, the membership proof verifi-
cation algorithm on B also agrees on the value
of Tm with B’s advancement verification algo-
rithm after they both reach element m. There-
fore, B’s membership proof verification algo-
rithm and both advancement verification algo-
rithms agree on the value of Tm after reaching
element m.
As above, there is an element in [i, j], ele-
ment r, that is common among A’s advance-
ment path, and A and B’s membership proof
paths. This is because both membership proof
paths start at i and go to or past j, and A’s
advancement path starts before i and touches
element j (since A’s membership proof must
be verifiable against the digest for element j,
as per the theorem assumptions).
Because A’s membership and advancement
proof verification algorithms must agree on the
value of T j for the membership proof to be ac-
cepted, and from the first authenticator agree-
ment claim once more, the membership proof
verification algorithm on A also agrees on the
value of T r with A’s advancement algorithm af-
ter reaching element r. From the same claim,
since B’s membership and A’s advancement
proof verification algorithms agree on the value
of Tm after reaching element m, they must also
agree on the value of T r after they reach ele-
ment r. As a result, the two membership proof
verification algorithms reach element r with the
same value for T r.
However, this contradicts Theorem 2. If the
adversary could manage to create two member-
ship proofs starting with different data values
on element i and computing the same authen-
ticator for element r, then he would be able to
produce same-version collisions, as well, which
Theorem 2 precludes. Therefore, the two data
elements d and d′ cannot be different.
5 Conclusions
In this work we describe, design and analyze the
security of a tamper-evident, append-only data
structure for maintaining secure data sequences
in a loosely coupled distributed system, where
individual system components may be mutually
distrustful. The resulting data structure, called
Authenticated Append-Only Skip List, allows
its maintainers to produce one-way digests of
the entire data sequence, which they can pub-
lish to others as a commitment on the contents
and order of the sequence. The maintainer can
produce efficiently succinct proofs that authen-
ticate a particular datum in a particular posi-
tion of the data sequence against a published
digest.
AASLs are secure against tampering even by
malicious structure maintainers. First, we have
shown that a maintainer cannot “invent” and
authenticate data elements for the AASL af-
ter he has committed to the structure. Sec-
ond, he cannot equivocate by being able to
prove conflicting facts about a particular po-
sition of the data sequence. This is the case,
even when the data sequence grows with time
and its maintainer publishes successive commit-
ments at times of his own choosing.
We have implemented and extensively mea-
sured the performance and storage require-
ments of AASLs (we present a discussion of
practical implementation considerations in the
Appendix). We have used AASLs extensively in
Timeweave [5], a system for preserving historic
integrity in trust-free peer-to-peer systems.
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A The Need For Bases
We give here a simple example of how “forget-
ting” the values of reusable authenticators can
allow a malicious maintainer to authenticate
conflicting membership claims across AASL
versions. Consider the authenticator for ele-
ment 8, in Figure 5; it is used in all membership
proofs verifiable against the digest of version 1
ending with element 9, since the authenticator
for element 9 depends on a single partial au-
thenticator, that for element 8. However, the
authenticator for element 8 is also used in all
membership proofs verifiable against the digest
of version 2 ending with element 10, because
the authenticator for element 10 also depends
on the authenticator for element 8 for one of its
partial authenticators.
A malicious maintainer can construct two au-
thenticators T 8 and T 8
′
for element 8 to ac-
commodate two different elements d8 and d
′
8,
respectively, using Equations 1 and 2, as fol-
lows:
T 8 = h(h(8‖0‖d8‖T
7) ‖ h(8‖1‖d8‖T
6) ‖
h(8‖2‖d8‖T
4) ‖ h(8‖3‖d8‖T
0))
T 8
′
= h(h(8‖0‖d′8‖T
7) ‖ h(8‖1‖d′8‖T
6) ‖
h(8‖2‖d′8‖T
4) ‖ h(8‖1‖d′8‖T
0))
He can then construct a single authenticator T 9
for element 9 based on T 8
′
:
T 9 = h(h(9‖0‖d9‖T
8′))
and use it to commit to version 1, which ends at
element 9, with this T 9 and the first advance-
ment proof A0,9:
A0,9 = 〈〈d′8; 〈T
7, T 6, T 4, T 0〉〉, 〈d9; 〈T
8′〉〉〉
The digest T 9 for version 1 authenticates d′8 in
position 8 with the following membership proof:
E8,9,d
′
8 = 〈〈d′8; 〈T
7, T 6, T 4, T 0〉〉, 〈d9; 〈T
8′〉〉〉
Now the malicious maintainer can construct
a corrupt authenticator T 10 for the 10-th ele-
ment, by mixing T 8 from the AASL that con-
tains d8 in position 8, and T
9, from the AASL
that contains d′8 in position 8:
T 10 = h(h(10‖0‖d10‖T
9)‖h(10‖1‖d10‖T
8))
0 0
3
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1
2 2
1
d
2
d
3
d
4
d
5
d
6
d
7
d
8
d
9
d
10
d
Advancement 0 to 9 Adv. 9 to 10
0 8 9 10
Figure 5: A repeat of Figure 3. An ex-
ample of advancement in a dynamic AASL.
In version 1, the AASL has elements 1
through 9. The corresponding advancement is
A0,9 = 〈〈d8; 〈T
7, T 6, T 4, T 0〉〉, 〈d9; 〈T
8〉〉〉. Then
the maintainer adds element 10 and pub-
lishes version 2, with advancement A9,10 =
〈〈d10; 〈T
9, T 8〉〉〉. The gray links delineate the
traversal paths that the two advancements take.
and publish it as the digest for version 2, with
the corresponding advancement proof
A9,10 = 〈〈d10; 〈T
9, T 8〉〉〉
In conflict to version 1, version 2 authenticates
element d8 in position 8, with the following
membership proof:
E8,10,d8 = 〈〈d8; 〈T
7, T 6, T 4, T 0〉〉, 〈d10; 〈T
9, T 8〉〉〉
The problem lies in the verifier’s forgetting
that the value for the purported authentica-
tor of element 8 was T 8
′
in the first advance-
ment A0,9 to version 1, whereas the same au-
thenticator has the value T 8 6= T 8
′
in the sec-
ond advancement A9,10 from version 1 to ver-
sion 2. To avoid this problem, verifiers keep
track of reusable authenticators, such as T 8
in the example above. With every advance-
ment received, a verifier checks that any reused
authenticators in the advancement agree with
those known so far in the basis for the same
AASL; then, the verifier updates that basis
with any new reusable authenticators included
in the newly received advancement.
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B Algorithms
Here we describe the proof construction algo-
rithms in detail. They do not participate in
any of the security proofs, since the security
guarantees offered by AASLs have to do with
what claims diligent verifiers accept.
First, Algorithm 6, describes how individ-
ual proof components are constructed. These
proof components participate in both member-
ship and advancement proofs.
Algorithm 6 SingleProofComponent (j) ⇒
C. Return a proof component C for the AASL ele-
ment in position j.
1: Tvec ← ∅ {Authenticators.}
2: for l = 0 to fj do
3: Tvec ← Tvec‖T
j−2l
4: end for
5: C ← 〈dj ;Tvec〉
6: Return C
Then, we proceed by describing how a whole
membership proof (Algorithm 7) and a whole
advancement proof (Algorithm 8) are con-
structed.
Algorithm 7 ConstructMembershipProof
(i, n) ⇒ E. Return a membership proof E for the
i-th element of an AASL, verifiable against the n-th
authenticator, where n ≥ i.
1: E ← ∅ {The proof.}
2: j ← i {Current element.}
3: repeat
4: C ← SingleProofComponent (j)
5: E ← E‖C
6: l ← SingleHopTraversalLevel (j, n)
7: j ← j + 2l
8: until j > n
9: Return E
C Proofs of Additional Claims
In this appendix, we prove the intuitive claims
we have used in the security analysis of the pa-
per.
First, we prove a claim necessary for
the collision-resistance theorem (Theorem 2),
Algorithm 8 ConstructAdvancementProof
(i, n) ⇒ A. Construct an advancement proof from
the i-th authenticator of an AASL to the n-th au-
thenticator, where n > i.
1: A← ∅ {The proof.}
2: j ← i {Current element.}
3: while j < n do
4: l ← SingleHopTraversalLevel (j, n)
5: j ← j + 2l
6: C ← SingleProofComponent (j)
7: A← A‖C
8: end while
9: Return A
showing that ProcessProofComponent is
collision-resistant.
Lemma 1 (Different proof components
cannot yield the same authenticator).
Consider two independent invocations of Pro-
cessProofComponent with inputs (j, C) and
(j′, C ′) respectively. If the two invocations yield
the same result T , then the inputs must be iden-
tical (j = j′ and C = C ′).
In both invocations, Line 10 must yield the
same result T . Since h is collision resistant, the
input P to the hash function must be the same
across invocations.
Input P is constructed in the loop of Lines 6
- 9, by concatenating a hash result, produced in
Line 7, to the running P in every iteration. To
ensure that P is the same in both invocations,
the loop must be iterated the same number of
times (so as to construct P ’s of the same bit
length), and all appended L-elements in the re-
spective invocations must be identical.
At every iteration of the loop, Line 7 com-
putes the current L by hashing together the
index j of the assumed AASL element to
which the current proof component should cor-
respond, the iteration number l (which is, by
default, the same across invocations), the pur-
ported data value of the j-th AASL element,
and the l-th authenticator value contained in
the proof component. Again, due to the col-
lision resistance of the hash function h, the
L values computed in the two invocations can
be identical only if the input index j is equal
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across invocations, and, similarly, if all parts
of the input proof component C are respec-
tively identical. This means that two invoca-
tions of ProcessProofComponent for inputs
(j, C) and (j′, C ′) can yield the same T if and
only if j = j′ and C = C ′.
As mentioned in the paper, second pre-image
resistance is a corollary of the collision resis-
tance theorem.
Theorem 4 (AASL Membership Proof
Second Pre-image Resistance). Consider
a membership proof Ei,n,d that verifies against
authenticator T the membership claim 〈i, n, d〉,
where 0 < i ≤ n, and d is a data value. A com-
putationally bound adversary cannot construct
efficiently a different membership proof E′ veri-
fiable against the same authenticator T that au-
thenticates a conflicting membership claim.
Suppose that an adversary can, in fact, con-
struct efficiently such a second proof E′ for the
membership claim t′ = 〈i, n′, d′〉, where n 6= n′
or d 6= d′. This means that he has an efficient
way to construct collisions as well: he creates
a legitimate AASL, picks a random position
and constructs a membership proof E for it,
then constructs another membership proof E′
for a different data element in the same posi-
tion. The two proofs would be a collision as
defined in Theorem 2. However, we have al-
ready shown that collisions are not possible, so
the proof machinery must also be second pre-
image resistant.
Before we can prove the authenticator agree-
ment claims, we must first establish that
skip list traversal, as described by SingleHop-
TraversalLevel, follows the rules of the skip
list, specifically that both source and destina-
tion of an l-level hop are divisible by 2l.
Lemma 2 (Correctness of skip list traver-
sal). In both advancement paths and member-
ship proof paths, as accepted by the verifica-
tion algorithms ProcessAdvancementProof
and ProcessMembershipProof, respectively,
every hop from element i to element j has
length 2l, such that 2l divides both i and j.
We prove this claim informally, by inspection
of the corresponding algorithms.
The path of an advancement is verified
by ProcessAdvancementProof. The verified
path starts with the source element i, given
in the input parameters to the algorithm, and
proceeds by increments of 2l in Line 7 inside
the loop. The exponent l of the path length
is determined by SingleHopTraversalLevel,
given the current element j and the ultimate
destination n of the advancement.
Similarly, a membership proof path is veri-
fied by ProcessMembershipProof. The path
starts with the source element i where the ele-
ment to be authenticated is claimed to reside in
the input parameters. Then the path proceeds
by increments of 2l in Line 5 for the first hop
and Line 15 for all subsequent hops. Both lines
receive their l from the result of SingleHop-
TraversalLevel, given the current element j
(i in the case of Line 5) and the ultimate desti-
nation n of the membership proof.
For both types of paths, it suffices to show
that the l computed by SingleHopTraversal-
Level is such that 2l divides j. Then it must
also divide the destination j + 2l. SingleHop-
TraversalLevel uses as a fall-through selec-
tion of l the value 0, which is consistent with
the claim, since 20 = 1 divides all elements.
When the loop in the algorithm is executed at
least once, the variable L returned is always
one that has passed the conditional check of
the loop, that is, 2L divides the source element
j (called i in SingleHopTraversalLevel).
We have shown that membership proof
paths, and paths of single advancements sat-
isfy the claim. For advancement paths of mul-
tiple advancements the claim also holds, since
connected advancements share an element: the
earlier one ends where the later one begins.
This means there are no additional hops in the
resulting advancement path to those included
in the individual advancements, which already
satisfy the claim as we showed above.
We continue by analyzing the concept of the
basis. We use the two lemmata below in au-
thenticator agreement.
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Lemma 3 (Correspondence of bases to
binary representations). Given the l-th
AASL element, if the binary representation
bkbk−1 . . . b0 of l has a 0 in bit position i, then
the corresponding basis vector Bl has an empty
value in vector position i, and a non-empty
value otherwise.
Bases are changed only via ProcessAd-
vancementProofComponent, so we concen-
trate on that to prove this lemma. We prove
the lemma by induction on all AASL elements,
and for every element on all hop lengths leading
to that element.
By definition, the base case holds, since B0
has only empty values, just as the binary rep-
resentation of 0 has only 0’s.
We assume that the lemma holds for all bases
up to that of element k − 1: that is, the basis
vector for AASL element index m ≤ k − 1 has
an empty value in position l if and only if the
binary representation of m has a 0 in bit posi-
tion l. We show that this must also hold for the
basis Bk that corresponds to element index k.
ProcessAdvancementProofComponent
yields the basis Bk for element index k when-
ever its input contains the source element
index j and the hop level l and j = k − 2l.
ProcessAdvancementProof expects the out-
come of such an invocation to be Bk = Bj+2
l
in Line 6.
There are fk + 1 ways in which ProcessAd-
vancementProofComponent can be invoked
to return Bk, one for each different level l at
which an advancement path reaches element k.
This is because, as shown in Lemma 2, Line 5 of
ProcessAdvancementProof can only return ls
such that the source (and consequently the des-
tination) of the level-l hop (computed in Line 7)
is divisible by 2l. Since fk is the exponent of the
largest power of 2 that divides k, as per Equa-
tion 3, there are fk + 1 invocations of Line 6
that make variable j in Line 7 to take the value
k.
We consider invocations of ProcessAd-
vancementProofComponent for all l such
that 0 ≤ l ≤ fk, where j = k − 2
l and B = Bj.
All of the possible input bases B = Bj corre-
spond to element indices j that precede k, and
as a result are covered by the inductive hypoth-
esis, above.
In the “then” branch of the conditional
(Line 7), the previous AASL element index j
had a 0 in the l-th bit position of its binary
representation. By turning that 0 to a 1 via
assigning a non-empty value to the l-th basis
vector element, we add 2l to the binary repre-
sentation of j = k − 2l, and we therefore reach
the binary representation for k.
If, instead, the “else” branch of the condi-
tional is executed, the previous basis vector
must have had a non-empty value in its l-th
position, and, as a result, the binary represen-
tation of j must have had a 1 in the l-th bit posi-
tion of its binary representation. The algorithm
places empty values in all vector positions from
the l-th one upwards that contain non-empty
values and sets to a non-empty value (the value
of the carry variable) the first vector position
m > l that it finds containing an empty value.
This translates into zeroing out all 1 bits in the
binary representation of j from the l-th to the
m − 1-st bit positions, and placing a 1 in the
formerly 0 m-th bit. Zeroing out a 1 bit in posi-
tion p means subtraction by 2p, so the result of
the operation is to add (2m−
∑m−1
p=l 2
p = 2l) to
the binary representation of j = k − 2l, which
again yields the binary representation of k.
This proves the inductive step, and as a re-
sult the lemma holds for all bases computed by
ProcessAdvancementProofComponent.
Lemma 4 (Survival of authenticators in
a basis). Consider a portion of an advance-
ment path that goes through elements e and
e′ = e+2l, for non-negative integers e and l. If
T e is the authenticator for element e computed
by the advancement processing algorithm after
reaching that element, then the value for T e is
preserved by the algorithm in the basis, and still
regarded as that of T e during processing of ele-
ment e′.
Informally, this lemma claims that while pro-
cessing intermediate hops between two elements
that are successive multiples of 2l, the advance-
ment verification algorithm remembers the au-
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thenticator of the first multiple, and uses its
value to check the correctness of the processed
advancement component when it reaches the
second multiple.
Since both e and e′ are divisible by 2l, then
in the binary representation of e, bits 0 through
at least l− 1 are all 0. Because of Lemma 3, all
basis elements in positions 0 through at least
l − 1 must be the empty value.
Case 1: e and e′ are consecutive ele-
ments in the advancement path. The ad-
vancement path takes a single hop at level l
from e to e′. To process this advancement hop,
the verifier executes an iteration of the loop
in ProcessAdvancementProof where the lo-
cal variable j is equal to e and the level returned
in Line 5 is l.
The value for T e was either passed as input
Tprev to the algorithm, if this hop is the first
in its advancement, or computed and stored
in Tcur in the previous iteration of the loop in
Line 8, and then copied to Tprev in Line 13.
Trivially, therefore, the value of Tprev , which
the algorithm regards as T e during the loop it-
eration that starts with j = e, is passed as input
to ProcessAdvancementProofComponent in
Line 6 and checked for consistency in Line 10.
This proves the claim for this case.
Case 2: e and e′ are not consecutive ele-
ments in the advancement path. Leaving
element e, the advancement path takes a hop at
level p, where p < l. Therefore, during the in-
vocation of ProcessAdvancementProofCom-
ponent that takes as input the basis of element
e, Line 7 is executed. What the algorithm re-
gards at the time as T e (passed to it in its input
parameters) is placed in the p-th position of the
basis. Since all vector positions up to position
l−1 contained the empty value before this mod-
ification, T e is the last (indeed, the only) non-
empty value in the newly created basis vector
in positions 0 through l − 1.
In what remains of the advancement path to
e′, the value for T e is always the last non-empty
element in vector positions 0 through l−1. This
is the case right after advancement element e
has been processed, as shown above. We use
this fact as the base case of an inductive argu-
ment.
Assume that T e is the last non-empty value
in the first l elements of the basis vector, and
it occupies position q < l. From Lemma 3,
the current element index is only divisible, at
most, by powers of 2 up to 2q. This means that
the next advancement hop, as determined by
SingleHopTraversalLevel in Line 5 of Pro-
cessAdvancementProof can only proceed by
a hop of length that is a power of 2 up to 2q.
This only changes the q+1 least significant bits
of the element’s binary representation. There-
fore, even if the “else” branch of the conditional
in ProcessAdvancementProofComponent is
executed, the value of T e is the last non-empty
value before the l-th element of the basis, and
as a result is pushed to a higher element posi-
tion of the basis.
The only advancement hop that can elimi-
nate T e from the first l elements of the ba-
sis is the last one, leading to e′. Then value
T e occupies position (l − 1) of the basis: we
showed above there cannot be any non-empty
values between itself and position l, and the
value must be eliminated from the first l posi-
tions of the basis, since e′ is divisible by 2l and
has no 1’s in its binary representation up to and
including bit position l − 1.
This means that when element e′ is reached
by the advancement proof verification algo-
rithm, the value for T e is in the basis, in po-
sition l− 1. This is the basis vector position in
which the algorithm expects to find the value
for T e during consistency checking in Line 12 of
ProcessAdvancementProofComponent. In-
deed, the last advancement proof component
that is processed is the one corresponding to
element index e′, which has in the l-th posi-
tion among its included authenticators what
the prover sent as T e
′
−2l = T e. Note that
when Line 12 is executed and eliminates value
T e from basis vector position l − 1, the local
loop variable c is equal to l − 1.
Consequently, we have shown that the claim
holds for both possible cases of advancement
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paths between e and e′, which proves the
lemma.
The proofs for evolutionary collision resis-
tance and for the authenticator agreement lem-
mata rely heavily on common elements in
membership or advancement proof paths. We
proceed with two lemmata that examine the
arrangement of common elements of parallel
paths. First, we look at common elements of
parallel paths, regardless of the path type (ad-
vancement or membership proof). Then, we
show that between two common elements in a
membership proof and advancement path, the
advancement path always takes shorter hops
than the membership proof path.
Lemma 5 (Common elements of parallel
paths). Let i and j be positive integers, such
that i < j.
1. Consider a path A that includes element i
and continues to j or past it. There is at
least one element in [i, j] that is shared by
A and every path that starts at or before i
and includes element j. The last element
on path A before j (or j if it is in path A)
is such an element.
2. (The mirror case) Consider a path A that
starts at or before element i and includes
element j. There is at least one element
in [i, j] that is shared by A and every path
that includes element i and continues to
element j or past it. The first element on
A after i (or i if it is in path A) is such an
element.
We prove only the first part of the lemma.
The proof for the second part of the lemma is a
trivial “mirror image” of the proof for the first
part.
If path A contains element j, then we are
trivially done.
Now, assume that path A does not contain
element j, and consider Figure 6. Path A must
be able to overshoot element j on its way from
i to beyond j. For this to happen, path A must
advance from its last element m before j (i.e.,
i ≤ m < j) past j, by a hop of level l and
n
Level l’ hop
Level l hop
Path A
Path B’
m ji
Figure 6: Two parallel, interleaved paths A and
B. A contains i, but not necessarily j. B con-
tains j but not necessarily i. The thick gray
lines represent single hops, as picked by Sin-
gleHopTraversalLevel.
length 2l, where 2l divides m, and j must not
participate in any linked list at level l or higher
(i.e., 2l does not divide j). The end point of
this hop is m+ 2l > j.
Supposem is not the single common element
among path A and every path that starts at
or before i and includes element j. Then there
must be a path B′ that manages to overshoot
element m on its way to j. For this to happen,
path B′ must advance to its first element n after
m (i.e., m < n ≤ j) past m, by a hop of level l′
and length 2l
′
, and element m must not partic-
ipate in any linked list at level l′ or higher (i.e.,
2l
′
does not divide m). This means that l′ > l,
since m is divisible by 2l. If n participates in
the linked list at level l′, it must be divisible by
2l
′
and, as a result, also by 2l. However, that is
impossible, since m < n ≤ j < m+ 2l.
Therefore, every path B that starts at or be-
fore i and includes j must include element m,
which also belongs to path A.
Lemma 6 (Common elements of proof
and advancement paths). If a membership
proof path has two common elements e and e′
with an advancement path, then every element
in the proof path between e and e′ is also shared
by that advancement path.
Consider a membership proof path and an
advancement path that share elements e and
e > e′, but share no other elements between
them.
To prove the lemma, we suppose that none of
the proof elements between e and e′ belong to
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Level l hop
AdvancementProof
e q 'ep
Figure 7: Proof and advancement paths be-
tween their common elements e and e′. The
thick gray line indicates a single hop, as calcu-
lated by SingleHopTraversalLevel.
the advancement path (see Figure 7). We show
below that this hypothesis leads to a contradic-
tion.
After common element e, the two paths di-
verge. The membership proof takes a hop at
level l, whereas the advancement takes a hop
at a lower level l′ < l. The advancement can-
not take a hop at a level higher than that of
the proof; if such a hop were available that
did not overshoot e′, then the proof would have
also taken it (see SingleHopTraversalLevel).
Furthermore, the advancement cannot take a
hop at the same level l as the proof, because
that would make the two paths identical be-
tween e and e′, which contradicts the hypoth-
esis that intermediate membership proof ele-
ments do not belong to the advancement path.
We call the next element on the advancement
path p = e + 2l
′
, and the next element on the
membership proof path q = e+ 2l.
Because of Lemma 5, there must be a com-
mon element between the two paths in [p, q].
However, this contradicts the hypothesis that
the two paths share no elements between e and
e′. As a result, all membership proof elements
between e and e′ must also belong to the ad-
vancement path.
Finally, we prove the two authenticator
agreement lemmata.
Lemma 7 (Authenticator agreement be-
tween a membership proof and an ad-
vancement proof verification). If the mem-
bership proof verification Algorithm 3 and the
advancement verification Algorithm 5, given an
advancement sequence and a membership proof,
respectively, agree on the value of authenticator
T n for element n during their independent ex-
ecutions, then they also agree on the authenti-
cator value T e of every other earlier element e
(e < n) that the advancement path and mem-
bership proof path have in common.
Let k be the number of common elements in
the two paths up to element n, and n = e1 >
e2 > . . . > ek the common elements, from last
to first. We prove the lemma using induction
on the common elements ei, by following back-
wards Algorithms 3 and 5.
The base case for e1 holds from the lemma
assumption, since e1 = n.
For the inductive step, we assume that the
two algorithms agree on the value of T ei . We
must show that the two algorithms also agree
on the value of T ei+1 when they process the cor-
responding proof component to reach element
ei+1.
When the two algorithms process their re-
spective proof component to compute the com-
mon T ei they use Equations 1 and 2. Specifi-
cally, they both compute
T ei = h(. . . ‖Llei‖ . . .)
= h(. . . ‖
Llei︷ ︸︸ ︷
h(ei‖l‖di‖T
ei−2
l
) ‖ . . .)
by invoking ProcessProofComponent in
Line 8 of ProcessMembershipProof and
Line 8 of ProcessAdvancementProof. Since
h is collision resistant, when the two algorithms
process element ei they must agree on the val-
ues of all T ei−2
l
, for every level l of linked lists
in which element ei participates.
Consider what happens in the two paths be-
tween elements ei+1 and ei. Common element
ei+1 must be the membership proof element im-
mediately preceding ei, because of Lemma 6.
Therefore, because of Lemma 2, ei = ei+1 + 2
l′
for some non-negative l′. The advancement hop
that arrives at ei must be at the same level l
′
or lower level. This is because a higher-level
l′′ > l′ hop would have taken the advancement
path from ei+1 to element ei+1+2
l′′ , which must
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lie beyond ei = ei+1 + 2
l′ . Therefore, the ad-
vancement path between ei+1 and ei follows ei-
ther a single hop of level l′ and length 2l
′
, which
is identical to that followed by the membership
proof path, or a sequence of shorter hops at
levels lower then l′.
Case 1: The advancement path is iden-
tical to the membership proof path. The
value for T ei+1 used to compute T ei in the
two algorithms while processing element ei is
the same as that known by the algorithms
while processing the previous element ei+1,
from Line 10 of ProcessMembershipProof
and Line 10 of ProcessAdvancementProof,
which proves the inductive step.
Case 2: The advancement path is not
identical to the membership proof path.
We must establish that the value of T ei+1 that
ProcessAdvancementProof computes while
processing element ei+1 is the same as that
known while processing the next common el-
ement ei. This follows from Lemma 4, since
elements ei+1 and ei are successive multiples of
2l
′
.
As a result, the value for T ei+1 produced by
the advancement verification algorithm while
processing element ei+1 is the same as the value
for T ei+1 used by the membership proof verifi-
cation algorithm while processing element ei.
This is the same value as that for T ei+1 pro-
duced by the proof verification algorithm while
processing element ei+1, as seen in Line 10 of
ProcessMembershipProof. This proves the
inductive step.
The inductive step holds for both possi-
ble cases of advancement paths, and as a re-
sult, the inductive argument holds, proving the
lemma.
Lemma 8 (Authenticator agreement be-
tween two independent advancement
paths). If two invocations of the advancement
verification Algorithm 5, given two advance-
ment sequences, respectively, agree on the value
of authenticator T n computed after reaching el-
ement n during their independent executions,
then they also agree on the authenticator value
T e computed after reaching every other earlier
element e (e < n) that the advancement paths
have in common.
This proof is similar in structure to that of
the preceding lemma.
Let k be the number of common elements in
the two paths up to element n, and n = e1 >
e2 > . . . > ek the actual elements, from last
to first. We prove the lemma using induction
on the common elements ei, by following back-
wards two invocations of Algorithm 5.
The base case for e1 holds from the lemma
assumption, since e1 = n.
For the inductive step, we assume that the
two algorithms agree on the value of T ei , after
reaching element ei. We must show that the
two algorithms also agree on the value of T ei+1
after they reach element ei+1.
When the two algorithms process their re-
spective proof component to compute the com-
mon T ei they use Equations 1 and 2. Specifi-
cally, they both compute
T ei = h(. . . ‖Llei‖ . . .)
= h(. . . ‖
Llei︷ ︸︸ ︷
h(ei‖l‖di‖T
ei−2
l
) ‖ . . .)
by invoking ProcessProofComponent in
Line 8 of ProcessAdvancementProof. Since
h is collision resistant, when the two algorithm
runs process element ei they must agree on the
values of all T ei−2
l
, for every level l of linked
lists in which element ei participates.
Consider what happens in the two paths be-
tween elements ei+1 and ei.
Case 1: Element ei+1 immediately pre-
cedes element ei in both paths. Both
paths advance from ei+1 to ei in a single hop at
level l, of length 2l.
As shown above, the two runs agree on the
value of T ei−2
l
. Since ei − 2
l = ei+1, and from
Line 10 of ProcessAdvancementProof, the
value for T ei+1 while processing element ei must
be identical to the value that the two runs com-
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pute for T ei+1 after processing the advancement
at the previous element ei+1.
Case 2: Element ei+1 does not immedi-
ately precede element ei in at least one
of the paths. The two paths merge from
two different immediate sources to element ei
on their way from element ei+1. Because of
Lemma 2, for some non-negative integers 0 ≤
l < l′ without loss of generality, the element
immediately preceding ei on the first path is
p = ei − 2
l, and on the second it is q = ei − 2
l′ .
Note that q < p.
Lemma 5 guarantees that there must be a
common element between the two paths in
[q, p], since the first path starts at or before
q and reaches p on its way to ei, whereas the
second path starts at q and goes past p on its
way to ei. Since q is the element immediately
preceding ei on the second path, it must be
the common element that Lemma 5 anticipates.
Therefore, ei+1 = q.
Because of Lemma 4, both runs of the ad-
vancement verification algorithm agree on the
value of T ei+1 after processing element ei+1 and
after reaching element ei.
The inductive step holds for both possible
cases of advancement path commonalities and,
as a result, the inductive argument holds, prov-
ing the lemma.
D Implementation
We implement authenticated append-only skip
lists using Java. We focus here on a disk-based
implementation, since it allows much larger
data sequences than any memory-only imple-
mentation can, as well as persistence in the face
of machine reboots.
An AASL is stored on disk as a linear file
that consists of a preamble and a sequence of
element entries, one for each element currently
contained in the AASL. An element entry con-
sists of a data section and an authenticator sec-
tion.
The data section primarily holds the datum
stored in the associated AASL element. This is
the datum that participates in the computation
of authenticators, as per Equations 1 and 2. We
call this the sensitive datum. Every element in
a single AASL has sensitive data of a constant
length, which is set when the AASL is initially
created.
The data section of element entries may also
contain an insensitive datum. This is also a
fixed-length bit string. However, it does not
participate in authenticator computations. In-
sensitive data may be useful information to the
maintainer, collocated with the sensitive data
for access efficiency, that need not be authen-
ticated to remote verifiers of the AASL. Since
insensitive data do not participate in authen-
ticator computations, they can be changed at
will by the AASL maintainer unobtrusively to
AASL verifiers.
The authenticator section of an element entry
contains the authenticator computed for that
element.
The preamble of the AASL file contains the
lengths in bytes of the sensitive and insensitive
data in element entries, and the element posi-
tion of the last incorporated element into the
AASL.
An empty AASL contains exactly one ele-
ment entry: the entry for element 0, which is a
special entry. Element entry 0 has inconsequen-
tial sensitive and insensitive data. Only its au-
thenticator is meaningful. This authenticator
is a value from the result domain of the hash
function used, and it is agreed upon among all
users of the AASL in advance.
Our implementation has a deviation from
the abstract design of AASLs described in Sec-
tion 3. We slightly modify how authenticators
are computed for elements of odd indices, which
only participate in a single linked list. For such
elements we skip the outer hash operation de-
scribed in Equation 2, from concatenated par-
tial authenticators to the actual authenticator
of the element. Since odd elements have only a
single partial authenticator, that single partial
authenticator is sufficient to ensure the collision
resistance of AASL digests, and can serve as the
actual authenticator of the element. Further-
more, since half of the element indices are odd,
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this savings in computation can be significant
compared to the overall computation required
by AASL operations.
Another implementation optimization in the
implemented AASLs deals with authentica-
tor redundancy in membership and advance-
ment proofs. In the idealized algorithms
ProcessMembershipProof and ProcessAd-
vancementProof, authenticators computed
for the previous proof component are com-
pared against the corresponding authentica-
tor included in the next proof component (see
Lines 10 and 10, respectively). Since we com-
pute these authenticators in the process of veri-
fying membership and advancement proofs any-
way, there is no need also to include them in the
proofs themselves. Consequently, we skip such
authenticators in the AASL implementation.
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